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INTRODUCTION

Texas news contained several highly publicized family violence
cases in 2001-news that has prompted change in the way the courts
deal with such violence in child custody determinations.' On May 2, a
Dallas father, John Battaglia, on unsupervised visitation with his two
youngest daughters, shot and killed them while their mother listened
on the telephone.' In June, a Houston mother, Andrea Yates,
drowned her five children, one by one, in a bathtub, and then called
the police.' On August 13, another Dallas father, Danny Dehoyos,
shot his estranged, pregnant wife and their two young girls before killing himself.4 Later that month, a Mansfield man was accused of brutally slaying his wife and two step-children.5 Although statewide
1. See Trebor Banstetter, Coverage Fuels Shock of Violence, FORT WORTH STARSept. 2, 2001, at lB.
2. Steve McGonigle, "I Guess I Was at My Wits' End," Dad Accused of Killing
Kids Says Work, Battles with Ex Got to Him, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 25, 2001,
at 1A [hereinafter McGonigle, Wits' End] (interview with John Battaglia, father).
3. Banstetter, supra note 1.
4. Connie Piloto & Jennifer Emily, Marriage Was Ugly Cycle of Jealousy, Rage:
Man Who Killed Wife, Kids, Himself Despondent Over Breakup, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2001, at IA.
5. Banstetter, supra note 1.
TELEGRAM,
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family violence statistics may be dropping-family violence incidents
dropped 3.5% between 1997 and 2000, and the number of women

killed by a partner or former partner dropped from 130 in 1995 to 99
in 1999-the severity of family violence cases appears to be increasing.6 The publicity has forced Texans to at least acknowledge the issue
of family violence. In the case of the Dallas father, John Battaglia, the
publicity has resulted in a change in Texas's family violence law.7
This Note examines Texas Senate Bill 1408 (SB 140), passed by the
Seventy-Seventh Texas Legislature, which amended Texas Family
Code (TFC) section 153.0049 relating to the history of domestic vio-

lence. 10 The bill had two main purposes: (1) to give direction to
judges "regarding the appointment of sole custody in family violence
cases," 11 and (2) to change the way Texas courts handle visitation

when a parent has a history of domestic violence.' 2 After a long Texas
summer of well-publicized domestic violence cases, this amendment
appeared to be the next logical, and much-needed, step in furtherance
of the public policy of this state. However, the statute, as amended,
fails to provide the necessary guidance to the courts because it leaves
key terms undefined, fails to demonstrate what evidence the legislature presumes should rebut the presumptions it contains, and continues to utilize a standard of review that is too broad.
6. Id.
7. Steve McGonigle, HP Girls' Deaths Inspire Bill, Parent with Violent Past
Would Need OK to Visit Child Alone, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 26, 2001, at 1A
[hereinafter McGonigle, Deaths Inspire Bill].
State legislators sent Gov. Rick Perry a bill last week that would not allow
a parent with a history of domestic violence to have unsupervised visits with
a child unless the parent can convince a judge that it is in the child's best
interests.
Rep. Toby Goodman, R-Arlington, said Friday that he drafted the measure and attached it to another domestic violence bill in response to the May
2 slayings of Faith and Liberty Battaglia, who police said were killed by their
father, John David Battaglia.
Id; see Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 586, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1119,
1119 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (Vernon 2002)).
8. Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S., 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1119.
9. Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 586, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1119,
1119 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004). The Act amended subsection (b)
and added subsection (e). Id.
10. See id.
11. Press Release, Sen. Mike Moncrief, Texas Senate, Moncrief Passes Protections
Against Domestic Violence (Feb. 15, 2001), at http://www.mike-moncrief.com/press
releases/2001/domesticviolence_021501.htm [hereinafter Press Release] (on file with
the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
12. Telephone Interview with Chris Young, Chief Clerk and General Counsel,
House Comm. on Juvenile Justice & Family Issues, Texas House of Representatives
(Nov. 16, 2001) (transcript on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review); see
McGonigle, Deaths Inspire Bill, supra note 7 ("Mr. Goodman, Chairman of the
House Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, said he was upset that Mr.
Battaglia was permitted unsupervised visits with his daughters despite repeated acts
of domestic violence against two spouses.").
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Part II of this Note provides a brief background of the problem of
domestic violence and of how the problem should factor into child
custody and visitation determinations. Part III details how the Texas
courts and legislature have responded to the problem. Part IV discusses the legislative history of SB 140 and the problems the bill addressed. Part V shows the inadequacies of TFC section 153.004 as
amended and recommends that the corresponding Louisiana statute
be used as a model for change. Part VI concludes that under Texas
public policy, such changes are required.
As stated in TFC section 153.001,13 Texas's public policy is to "(1)
assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with
parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the
child; [and] (2) provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for
the child. ... "14 SB 140, an amendment to TFC section 153.004, fur-

thers that goal. The amendment also attempts to protect the parent
who would lose custody to a batterer. 1 5 However, the amendment
does not go far enough. TFC section 153.004, as amended, still leaves
too much procedural discretion to the trial judge. 6 The Texas Legislature should revisit the statute, clarify ambiguous terms, and add further substantive and procedural protections.
II.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES

In order to understand the "best interest of the child" in cases involving domestic violence, it is important to have a working knowledge of the social problem.' 7 Only a brief review of the problem as it
relates to TFC section 153.004 will be made in this Note. 8 By enacting legislation under TFC chapter 153, the legislature followed Louisiana's model in acknowledging that the domestic violence problem
does not end when the batterer and the battered are separated. 19 The
legislative findings behind a Louisiana statute reflect the new attitude
the Texas Legislature has also taken with respect to family violence:
The legislature ... finds that the problems of family violence do not

necessarily cease when the victimized family is legally separated or
13. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 153.001 (Vernon 2002).

14. Id. § 153.001(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
15. See Act of May 17, 2001: Hearings on Tex. S.B. 140 Before the Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 77th Leg., R.S. Tape 1, Side B (Jan. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Senate Hear-

ings] (testimony of Tina Price, Attorney, Women's Haven of Tarrant County, Inc.)
(tapes on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
16. See James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, 52 SMU L.

REV.

1197,

1209 (1999) (noting that the "'abuse of discretion' standard" at the reviewing court is
"all-forgiving," allowing the court to assume "that the trial judge did not find the

evidence of violence to be 'credible'").
17. See Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1087-88 (1991).
18. See id. for a more thorough review of the problem as it relates to divorce and
child custody determinations.

19. See infra notes 260-66 and accompanying text.
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divorced. In fact, the violence often escalates, and child custody
and visitation become the new forum for the continuation of the
abuse. Because current laws relative to child custody and visitation
are based on an assumption that even divorcing parents are in relatively equal positions of power, and that such parents act in the children's best interest, these laws often work against the protection of
the children and the abused spouse in families with a history of family violence. Consequently, laws designed to act in the children's
best interest may actually effect
a contrary result due to the unique
20
dynamics of family violence.
A.

Parents and Custody Determinations in Domestic Violence Cases

Both the courts and the legislature consider the effect custody hearings and determinations will have on the parents. Yet both proponents and opponents of domestic violence custody legislation believe
that the courtroom can still become a forum for abuse of the other
parent. 21 This "abuse" forms the argument for both sides.
A male batterer is twice as likely to seek custody of his children in
divorce proceedings. 22 His purpose in doing so is not the best interest
of the child; rather, he seeks custody to continue to abuse the
mother.23 When the trial court gives custody to a batterer, it arguably
advocates punishment that can take several forms. 24 Awarding custody to the batterer punishes the mother for having been abused in
the first place-because she allowed herself to be battered, she is not
a stable, responsible mother who is able to care for her child. 25 For
example, one Texas mother lost her custody battle because she could
not hold a job; her employers were not tolerant of the effects of her
batterer's behavior.2 6 He would disable her car so that she could not
20. Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:361
(West 2000).
21. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1095.
22. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 2, Side A (testimony of Susan Wells
McCutchan, Director of Development, Genesis Women's Shelter). See Cahn, supra
note 17, for a discussion supporting the Author's assumption that the mother is the
likely abused partner in a domestic violence relationship. The Author realizes that
role is sometimes reversed and does not wish to minimize the seriousness or the effect
of domestic violence in other contexts. In the last few decades, the legislature has
responded to the concerns of women's advocate groups, casting the spotlight on women's issues relating to domestic violence. See id. at 1046-49.
23. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Patricia
Micco, High School Teacher, victim); Cahn, supra note 17, at 1058 n.99.
24. See, e.g., Senate Hearings,supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Patricia Micco, High School Teacher, victim); Cahn, supra note 17, at 1044; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
25. Cahn, supra note 17, at 1044.
26. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Patricia
Micco, High School Teacher, victim); see also Press Release, supra note 11 ("We know
of cases where the parent who has committed domestic violence has been awarded
sole conservatorship simply because they earn more money.").
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol9/iss1/6
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leave to go to work. 27 He would constantly call her place of employment. 28 He even decided that he would no longer "babysit" their children, so he brought the children, naked, to her work, and left them
there.29 Once, he jumped up and down on the roof of the car, with
her in it, until the roof caved in. 3° After witnessing this behavior, her
employers would dismiss her.3 Even after she was away from her
32
batterer, he continued to hinder her ability to find new employment.
Her batterer's behavior, not hers, was responsible for her "instability"
or her inability to hold a job.33
Another design of a batterer is to threaten to take custody of their
children to "get to" her, in one of two ways.3 4 The threat that the
batterer will take custody away from the mother, when and if she separates from him, keeps her from leaving him or forces her to return to
him. 35 The batterer reminds the mother of what a bad witness she
would make in court-unstable, often hostile, with no place to liveseemingly incapable of supporting her children. 36 The mother, realizing her situation and how real the threat of losing custody of her children is, returns to her batterer out of fear for her children's safety or
fear that she will never see her children again.3 7 If the mother does
leave the batterer and also loses custody of her children, he can continue to manipulate and possibly abuse her, if she wants to continue to
see her children.3 8 For example, he can use the exchange time to verbally and physically abuse her,39 or he could repeatedly find an excuse
to contact the mother about the visitation, and thus harass her by forcing her to constantly confront her batterer.4 °
27. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Patricia Micco,
High School Teacher, victim).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id. (testimony of Tina Price, Attorney, Women's Haven of Tarrant County,
Inc.) (testifying regarding patterns commonly seen in domestic violence situations).
35. See id.; Robert B. Straus, Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 229, 232 (1995).
36. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Tina Price,
Attorney, Women's Haven of Tarrant County, Inc.); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process:Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias
in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257 & n.30 (1993) ("Over a quarter of the survey
respondents in the District of Columbia study reported that 'women who respond to
domestic violence by leaving the home' sometimes or often are viewed as 'unstable
and less fit to have custody."').
37. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Tina Price,
Attorney, Women's Haven of Tarrant County, Inc.).
38. Cahn, supra note 17, at 1058 n.99, 1064; see Straus, supra note 35, at 232.
39. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 17, at 1095 & n.286.
40. See, e.g., id. at 1095 n.288.
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On the flip side of the story, however, is the fear that one parent
will "lie . . . to gain the upper hand in a custody [dispute]."'" Unchecked legislation in this area, opponents say, will allow a financially
able parent, who is willing to falsely accuse the other of domestic vio-

lence, to financially drain the other parent, who must defend against

these accusations or risk losing custody of the children.4 2 The argu-

ment that false accusations will run rampant has been heard before,
especially in the context of sexual abuse claims in custody or divorce
proceedings.4 3 While the rights of the parents are relevant, though,
the best interest of the child is the controlling factor in custody and
visitation arrangements.4 4
B.

Children and Custody Determinationsin
Domestic Violence Cases

The greatest factor in a court's custody ruling should be the effect it
will have on the child. The "easy" domestic abuse case exists when
clear evidence proves that the child was abused. However, anything
short of proven child abuse against that specific child blurs the court's
determination of what actually is in the best interest of that child. In
the past, many legislatures and courts ignored any abuse that did not
directly, physically impact the child, and thus ignored the best interest
of the child.4 5 Two assumptions have hindered more progressive laws
in this arena: that "1) abuse directed only at a spouse is not necessarily

41. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S.
(2001) (summarizing statement of David Shelton, President, Texas Father's Alliance),
available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
42. See Hearings on Tex. H.B. 960 Before the House Comm. on Juvenile Justice &
Family Issues, 77th Leg., R.S. Tape 1, Side B (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Dale Tillery, Member, House Comm. on Juvenile Justice &
Family Issues) (tapes on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
43. See, e.g., Colleen McMahon, Due Process:ConstitutionalRights and the Stigma
of Sexual Abuse Allegations in Child Custody Proceedings,39 CATH. LAW. 153 (1999).
"The rights of the parents, however, are often trivialized by inadequate procedures
that fail to safeguard them from the potentially catastrophic effects of sexual abuse
allegations." Id. at 154. McMahon's Article gives an overview of the state's role as
parens patriae,the constitutionally significant difference between permanent and temporary loss of custodial and parental rights, the current standard of proof utilized by
most states to effect a temporary loss of rights (preponderance of the evidence), and
argues that a higher standard of proof should apply in the context of sexual abuse
allegations (clear and convincing evidence).
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (Vernon 2002).
45. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1044; Czapanskiy, supra note 36, at 252-57. See
generally Judith Resnik, CategoricalFederalism:Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe,
111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) (discussing the Violence Against Women Act); Tulin D.
Acikalin, Comment, Debunking the Dichotomy of Nonintervention: The Role of the
State in Regulating Domestic Violence, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1045 (2000) (exploring the
historical development of domestic violence legislation).
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damaging to a child, and 2) being a violent spouse is not necessarily
related to a person's parenting ability."46
Several facts about domestic abuse and its effects on children, now
well-established, help to clear the haze. "The bulk of the research
shows that children who live in households where their fathers beat
their mothers are victims of domestic violence-they are harmedwhether the abuse is direct or indirect."4 7 A batterer's abuse will not
likely end with his partner, but will extend to the children as well.4 8
The likelihood could be as high as seventy percent.4 9 The risk that the
batterer will "physically, sexually and/or emotionally abuse the children" actually increases after the parents have separated5" because the
child takes on the role of the previous partner.5 1 Children suffer severe psychological trauma from witnessing abuse.52 They may feel responsible for the violence, or they may disrespect the abused parent.53
Some common characteristics shared by children who have witnessed
abuse are recurrent nightmares, academic failure, and failure to thrive
physically.5 4 They often develop either an immature or over-mature
behavioral style. 5 Merely witnessing abuse may cause a child to suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder.5 6 Children who witness abuse
may try to intervene, running the risk of being physically injured as
well.
A prime example of a parent's history of abuse affecting his parenting ability is found in the Battaglia story.57 On May 2, 2001, Battaglia's children, Faith and Liberty, became pawns in their father's
twisted game to get revenge against his ex-wife. 58 No one, especially
not the courts, can say they did not see some act of violence on the
horizon; all they had to do was look to his past. 59 Battaglia married
46. Mildred Daley Pagelow, Commentary, Justicefor Victims of Spouse Abuse in
Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE & VICrIMs 69, 77 (1993).
47. Id.
48. Sarah M. Buel, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: Twelve Practical
Recommendations for Lawyers, Advocates, Judges, Probationand Court Personnel 6
(1999), availableat http://www.met.police.uk/enoughisenough/cd-rom.htm (last modified Jan. 12, 2003) (copy on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Dr. Ashley
Lind, Director of Clinical and Professional Services, Genesis Women's Shelter).
52. See id.; Cahn, supra note 17, at 1055.
53. Buel, supra note 48, at 7.
54. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Dr. Ashley
Lind, Director of Clinical and Professional Services, Genesis Women's Shelter).
55. Id.
56. Id.; Daniel G. Saunders, Child Custody Decisions in Families Experiencing Woman Abuse, 39 Soc. WORK 51, 52 (1994).
57. See McGonigle, Wits' End, supra note 2.
58. Id.
59. McGonigle, Deaths Inspire Bill, supra note 7 ("Mr. Goodman, Chairman of
the House Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, said he was upset that
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his first wife, Michelle Ghetti, in 1985, and had one child.6" After several instances where Battaglia was violent with her and her son from a
prior marriage, Ghetti filed for divorce in September 1986.61 What
happened next demonstrated Battaglia's propensity for violence.
After learning in August 1987 that [Ghetti] had filed criminal
charges against him for a previous assault, [Ghetti] said . . .that
Battaglia rode up to her on a bicycle as she walked home from the
bus stop and said, "If I am going to jail, I am going to make it well
worth my while."
"He then began to beat me around the face and head. His first
blow broke my nose, his second blow hemorrhaged my eye, his third
blow dislocated my jaw, and the fourth blow knocked me unconscious," [Ghetti] said. "Witnesses have stated that 'if62 they had not
come running to my aid, he would have killed me."
The violence continued in Battaglia's second marriage to Mary Jean
Pearle. 63 The Highland Park Police responded to several domestic
disputes in their home.6 4 On Christmas Day in 1999, a police report
stated that Battaglia had arrived to pick up the couple's daughters for
church when he became violent, which the girls witnessed.6 5 Battaglia
was verbally abusive and then physically abusive to the girls' mother:
66
hitting her in the face twenty times, punching her, and kicking her.
Battaglia was convicted for the assaults on both Ghetti and
Pearle-both were disputes about the children. 67 He was still on probation when yet another incident occurred, and he learned from his
attorney that "court officials were preparing to revoke the two-year
probation he received for the 1999 assault on Ms. Pearle."6 8 On May
69
2, Battaglia met Pearle to pick up the girls for his twice-weekly visit.
According to an interview Battaglia gave to the Dallas Morning News,
no words about the probation revocation, only "dirty looks" were exchanged between Pearle and Battaglia.7" However, when he later
pressed his daughter Faith about her reluctance to discuss their
planned camping trip, she seemed to confirm that Pearle was still atMr. Battaglia was permitted unsupervised visits with his daughters despite repeated
acts of domestic violence against two spouses.").
60. Steve McGonigle, Link to BattagliaInspiredAbuse Fight, Advocacy by Murder
Suspect's Ex-Wife Helped Alter Laws on Domestic Violence, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 27, 2001, at 37A [hereinafter McGonigle, Link to Battaglia].
61. Id.
62. Mary McKee, Arrested FatherHad History of Violence, Man Accused of Shooting Daughters Was on Probation,FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 5, 2001, at lB.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. McGonigle, Wits' End, supra note 2.
69. McGonigle, Deaths Inspire Bill, supra note 7.
70. McGonigle, Wits' End, supra note 2.
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tempting to have his probation revoked.7" When they got to Battaglia's apartment, they placed a phone call to Pearle, and Battaglia shot
the girls while Pearle listened on the other end.7" In fact, it was his
fear of having his probation revoked-fear of losing all contact with
his girls-that appears to have prompted this instance.7 3 "'I walked
away from both my marriages with nothing on the promise that I
could see my kids, and then they tried to take that away from me.'"7
Given what is now known about domestic violence and its effects,
how could a court ever judge that awarding custody or giving unsupervised visitation to a batterer is in the best interest of the child?
How did Battaglia get unsupervised visitation after demonstrating
such a propensity for violence? Since SB 140 was enacted, the major
problem has lain not with the court finding that the batterer is the
more fit parent, but with the court recognizing and labeling the batterer as a batterer.7 5
III.

THE TEXAS RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS

A.

The Statutory Response

In 1991, Professor Cahn, in her review of child custody legislation
across the United States, recognized Texas for its progressive law regarding joint conservatorship (custody) in domestic violence cases.76
Under 1991 Texas law, if the court found a history or pattern of family
violence, it could not award the parents joint custody.7 7 At that time,
Texas had not yet joined the states that presumed joint custody was in
the best interest of the child. 78 The legislature added that presumption in 1995 with TFC section 153.131(b).7 9 In 1997, the legislature
provided that the presumption would not apply if the court found a
history of family violence involving the parents.8 0 Although Texas appeared progressive in its legislation regarding family violence, the
71. Id.
72. McKee, supra note 62.
73. See id.
74. McGonigle, Wits' End, supra note 2 (quoting John Battaglia).
75. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1072-73.
76. Id. at 1067.
77. See Act of May 26, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 744, § 6, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws
2666, 2669, repealed by Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 113, 282 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (Vernon
2002)).
78. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1067 n.141. "Unlike other statutes discussed in this
subpart, Texas has no preference for joint custody." Id.
79. See Act of May 26, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 751, § 32, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
3888, 3900-01 (codified as amended at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b)).
80. See Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1193, § 20, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws
4596, 4602 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b)). Again, the legislature uses the term "history" without giving the reader the benefit of defining it. See
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Texas law still had some obvious shortcomings: it did not provide guidance to the court in appointing the batterer as sole managing conservator or in providing visitation to the batterer. 81 It was not until 2001,
ten years later, that the legislature took Professor Cahn's advice,
along with the advice of sociologists, psychologists, and advocates for
victims of domestic abuse, and amended TFC section 153.004 to address these issues. 82
1. Section 153.004(a)
In order to understand the achievement of SB 140 and the shortcomings it addressed, the statute must be reviewed with an eye to how
it read before it was amended via the language introduced in subsection (b) and the addition of new subsection (e):
(a) In determining whether to appoint a party as a sole or joint
managing conservator, the court shall consider evidence of the intentional use of abusive physical force by a party against the party's
spouse, a parent of the child, or any person younger than 18 years of
age committed within a two-year period83preceding the filing of the
suit or during the pendency of the suit.
Subsection (a) only instructs the court to consider evidence of abuse
(it can be only one incident, a history or pattern is not required); however, it does not instruct the court on how to handle this evidence.8 4
And the section only requires a court to consider the evidence from a
limited time period-from two years before the suit was filed until the
time the court enters judgment.8 5
2.

Section 153.004(b)

Subsection (b), just as it did before SB 140, lays out the prohibition
against appointing the parents as joint managing conservators, stating
"[t]he court may not appoint joint managing conservators if credible
evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present child
neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the
other parent, a spouse, or a child."86 Subsection (b) had the only preSB-140 language in 153.004 that specifically limited a judge's discretion once the court found that domestic violence had occurred.8 7
When a court appoints parents as joint managing conservators, it is
under the premise that both parents will "share in the rights and duties of raising their child after the parents have separated or dissolved
81. Cahn, supra note 17, at 1067.
82. See Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 586, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
1119, 1119 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b), (e)).
83. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(a).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. § 153.004(b).
87. See discussion infra Part JV.A. (detailing the additions to subsection (b)).
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their marriage. '' 88 When abuse has occurred in the family, this premise is no longer workable. In fact, by appointing the parents as joint
managing conservators, the court is, essentially, ordaining the continued abuse of the victim,89 whether the victim is the parent or the
child.9" This section is both a "parent-friendly" and a "child-friendly"
section, as it takes an affirmative step to take control away from the
abuser. 91
3.

Section 153.004(c)

Subsection (c) is the next logical step when subsection (b)-the
court has found a history or pattern of domestic violence or abuse and
has refused to appoint the parents as joint managing conservatorsapplies. 9z TFC section 153.004(c) states that "[t]he court shall consider the commission of family violence in determining whether to
deny, restrict, or limit the possession of a child by a parent who is
appointed as a possessory conservator." 93 If the court does not appoint the parents as joint managing conservators, it presumably must
appoint one of the parents as sole managing conservator. 94 When a
court appoints a managing conservator, it may then appoint "one or
more possessory conservators. ' '9 5 In fact, when the court appoints a
sole managing conservator, TFC section 153.19196 presumes that the
other parent shall be appointed as a possessory conservator, unless
such appointment "is not in the best interest of the child and that pawould endanger the physical or emotional
rental possession or access
' 97
child.
the
of
welfare
TFC section 153.191 tells the court under what circumstances it may
refuse to appoint a parent as possessory conservator; 98 subsection (c)
of 153.004 requires the courts to consider certain evidence in rendering the possession order9 9 (the legislature and the courts distinguish
between "possession" and "access," as discussed in the next subpart).
Under this subsection, the court must consider all evidence of family
88. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a)(3).
89. Cahn, supra note 17, at 1064.
90. See discussion supra Part H.A.-B.
91. See Cahn, supra note 17, at 1067 ("[The Texas Statute] leaves the judge no
discretion because joint custody simply cannot be ordered when there has been a
history of abuse. Such a statute cogently recognizes the problem of joint custody for
women and children in abusive situations.").
92. See Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. 1990); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 153.004(b), (c).
93. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(c).
94. Id. § 153.131(a). This preference is commonly called the "parental preference," but it is still subject to section 153.004. See Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 166.
95. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.006(a).
96. Id. § 153.191.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 153.001(a)(3).
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violence, not just the instances occurring within two years of the suit
being filed or occurring while the suit is pending-the subsection (a)
time limitations. 10 TFC section 153.191 is also not limited to the specific situations of abuse that subsection (a) lists.10 1 Therefore the
court must consider, in rendering a possession order, any evidence of
domestic violence even if it occurred ten years prior (excludable
under subsection (a)) and even if the victim was the abuser's exspouse (debatably excludable under subsection (a)). 10 2 If the abusive
parent is appointed as possessory conservator, under TFC chapter
153, subchapters B and F, that parent gets
the benefit of a statutory
0 3
possession order subject to modification.
4.

Section 153.004(d)

Subsection (d) applies in allowing the parent "access" to the child,
as opposed to "possession" of the child as described in the previous
subpart.1 0 4 TFC section 153.004(d) states:
(d) The court may not allow a parent to have access to a child for
whom it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a
history or pattern of committing family violence during the two
years preceding the date of the filing of the suit or during the pendency of the suit, unless the court:
(1) finds that awarding the parent access to the child would
not endanger the child's physical health or emotional welfare
and would be in the best interest of the child; and
(2) renders a possession order that is designed to protect the
safety and well-being of the child and any other person who has
been a victim of family violence committed by the parent and
that may include a requirement that:
(A) the periods of access be continuously supervised by
an entity or person chosen by the court;
(B) the exchange of possession of the child occur in a
protective setting;
(C) the parent abstain from the consumption of alcohol
or a controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481,
Health and Safety Code, within 12 hours prior to or during
the period of access to the child; or
(D) the parent attend and complete a battering intervention and prevention program as provided by Article 42.141,
Code of Criminal Procedure, or, if such a program is not
available, complete a course of treatment under Section
153.010.105
100. Compare id. § 153.004(a), with id. § 153.004(c).
101. Compare id. § 153.191 (leaving appointment to judicial discretion), with id.
§ 153.004(a) (specifying certain evidence that the court must consider).
102. See id. § 153,004(a)-(c).
103. See id. §§ 153.071-.076, .311-317.
104. Id. § 153.004(d).

105. Id.
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Hopkins v. Hopkins" 6 described the difference between "possession"
and "access" as it applies in Texas.' 7
The Hopkins court applied the ordinary meanings of the terms
"possession" and "access" to children, and the court drew the same
distinction10as
it does when addressing "access to and possession of
8
property.'
A person with rights of "access to" children may approach them,
communicate with them and visit with them, but may not take possession or control of the children away from the managing conservator. A person with rights to "possession of" children may exercise
possession and control of the children, to the exclusion of all other
persons including
the managing conservator, during periods of
09
possession.'
Therefore, access is a more limited parental right than possession.
However, according to Hopkins, if a court gives some access to the
parent, then that parent must be appointed a possessory conservator." 0 If a court grants supervised visitation, for instance, then it is
obliged to appoint the parent as possessory conservator. 1 ' Then, the
court may see fit to limit the terms of possession or access.' 1 2 This
finding seems to make the legislature's distinction between possession
and access superfluous because, in essence, the parent would be gaining the right to be a possessory conservator through the right of
access.
Subsection (d) was added during the Seventy-Sixth Legislature and
became effective September 1, 1999."' The subsection reads like a
rebuttable presumption: if the court finds that family violence has occurred in the past two years, the party is not allowed to visit the child
unless certain provisions are met. 1 1 4 First, the court must find that the
access will not endanger the child's welfare and that such access is in
the child's best interest. 115 Then the court must render an appropriate
possession order, protecting both the child and any other victim of the
106. 853 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
107. Id. at 137-38.
108. Id. at 137.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 137-38. The court held that a trial court could only deny appointing
a parent a possessory conservator if it found that neither possession nor access were
in the best interest of the child. Id. at 138. Because the trial court gave some limited
access to the father, it presumed that the court found that access would be in the best
interest of the child, and therefore held it was error to deny the father being appointed possessory conservator. Id.
112. See id.
113. Act of May 17, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, § 3, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3411,
3412 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d) (Vernon 2002)).
114. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(d).
115. Id. § 153.004(d)(1).
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parent's violence. 116 The court may also design its own visitation order.1 17 While the legislature suggests ways to protect the child and the
abused party in (A) through (D), these are only suggestions and do

not restrict the court's order. 1

8

Further, the court is only required to

consider the last two years of family violence.1 1 9 Combined with the
effects of the Hopkins holding, subsection (d) does little to accomplish
the goal of protecting the child.
B.

The Courts' Responses Prior to Senate Bill 140

According to the attorneys who specialize in domestic violence
cases, the courts have been more reluctant than the legislature to 1re20
spond to problems of domestic violence in child custody cases,
much to the dismay of the legislature.1 21 When the public hearing on

SB 140 was held before the Senate Jurisprudence Committee, one of
the largest issues addressed by witnesses was the trial court's treatment of domestic violence.122 When one woman testified that she had
lost custody of her children because the father appeared to be a more
stable parent even though his violence was well documented,1 2 3 Senator Wentworth was astonished by her testimony. 124 According to the
Senator, judges have a natural bias toward favoring the mother in a
custody dispute.1 25 He could not believe that a judge could overcome
this bias to award custody to an abuser. 126 Senator Wentworth then
assured those at the hearing that the situation did not happen in Bexar
County.1 27 However biased a judge may be toward awarding custody
116. Id. § 153.004(d)(2).
117. See id.
118. Id. (stating that the possession order "may include" the requirements in one or
more of (A) through (D)).
119. Id. § 153.004(d).
120. See Buel, supra note 48. Buel is a "Clinical Professor, University of Texas
School of Law (UTSL), teaching 'Domestic Violence and the Law' course and codirector of the UTSL Domestic Violence Clinic; co-founder National Training Center
on Domestic and Sexual Violence, former domestic violence, child abuse and juvenile
prosecutor, and advocate for 22 years." Id. at 1 n.1. See generally Senate Hearings,
supra note 15, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Ellen Marrus, Associate Professor of
Law, University of Houston Law Center, and Tina Price, Attorney, Women's Haven
of Tarrant County, Inc.), Tape 2, Side A (testimony of Hanna Rettering, Vice President, Texas National Organization for Women).
121. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at Tape 2, Side A (testimony of Sens. Jeff
Wentworth and David Bernsen, Members, Senate Jurisprudence Comm.).
122. See id.
123. See id. at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Patricia Micco, High School Teacher,
victim).
124. Id. (statement of Sen. Jeff Wentworth, Member, Senate Jurisprudence
Comm.).
125. Id. at Tape 2, Side A.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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to the mother, a review of the cases interpreting section 153.004 (most
of them unpublished) shows just how the statute may be twisted. 28
Ewing v. Ewing1 29 provides an example of how a court may restrict
the parties' manipulation of TFC section 153.004 by limiting the evidence that is introduced. 130 In Ewing, the husband was appealing the
award of custody to his wife.1 31 He claimed that the trial court had
disregarded the presumption in favor of appointing joint managing
conservators and had refused to allow him to introduce evidence
about the mother's violent nature.1 32 The court of appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to appoint the
couple as joint managing conservators.133 The mother testified at trial
that her husband had been verbally and physically abusive throughout
their six years together,3 and though the father produced evidence
that Natasha hit him and their son once,13 5 the court excluded a significant portion of the evidence he sought to introduce. 1 36 The judge did
not appoint the parties as joint
managing conservators because of
37
their tumultuous relationship.1
With respect to the evidence that the judge refused to consider, the
court of appeals noted, "the admission or exclusion of evidence is a
matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.' 1 38 In Ms. Ewing's situation, the court's discretion worked in her favor, disallowing
evidence to come in that it considered irrelevant. 1 39 "[Q]uestions of
whether evidence is remote or irrelevant is [sic] also within the trial
court's discretion.' 140 The excluded evidence included testimony that
the mother had shot and killed a man and a tape recording that
showed she was too drunk to care for her son, her violent nature, and
her inattentiveness to household chores.14 ' However, the shooting incident happened twenty years prior to the proceedings, and the
records regarding the crime were sealed.142 She had shot a man as he
128. See infra notes 129-97 and accompanying text.
129. No. 04-96-00323-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 2667 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
May 21, 1997, no writ) (not designated for publication).
130. Id. at *12.
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *7-8.
134. Id. at *5-6.
135. Id. at *6.
136. Id. at *11-13.
137. See id. at *7-8.
138. Id. at *12 (citing Wolfe v. Wolfe, 918 S.W.2d 533, 538-39 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1996, writ denied)).
139. See id. at *11-13.
140. Id. at *12 (citing Kotrla v. Kotrla, 718 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
141. See id. at *11-13.
142. Id. at *12-13.
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was attacking her, and was cleared of any charges. 1 43 The court of
appeals upheld the judge's exclusion of the evidence. 4 4
In the Ewing case, the court's broad use of discretion was appropriate, but other judgments have not been. 4 5 In In re A.L.R., 14 6 the appellate court's abuse of discretion standard of review worked an
injustice on the child and the mother. 147 The trial judge did not find
"based upon the evidence presented, that [the father] was intentionally abusive or used physical force against [the mother].... 148 The
reviewing court agreed with the mother that the trial court's finding
was not supported by the record:
The social study concludes that [the mother] was abused by [the
father] on various occasions and that the allegations of abuse were
validated by [the father] himself. [The mother] testified regarding
the abuse at the trial, stating that the last episode occurred on June
25, 1993 immediately prior to her decision to permanently end her
relationship with [the father]. Finally, [the father] admitted assaulting [the mother] on more than one occasion. There is no evidence
in the record to the contrary. Therefore,
we conclude that the trial
149
court's [finding is] unreasonable.
The court of appeals, however, did not reverse the decision appointing
the father as sole managing conservator.150 Even though the father
was abusive, the court of appeals found that the record, when reviewed as a whole, supported the trial court's appointment of the father as sole managing conservator because the father could provide a
more "stable" environment. 15 1 The court of appeals held that the father's abuse was "still only one factor the trial court must consider in
determining the best interest of the child." 1 2 The exclusion of the
evidence at trial caused the mother further injury on appeal-it made
possible the appellate court's finding that it was in the child's best
interest to give custody to the abusive, albeit "stable," father.15 3
In Long v. Long,1 54 the court got around the TFC section
153.004(b) prohibition against appointing a joint managing conserva143. Id.
144. Id. at *13-14.
145. Compare id. at *14, with In re A.L.R., No. 04-96-00455-CV, 1997 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3427, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 2, 1997, no writ) (not designated
for publication).
146. A.L.R., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 3427, at *6-7.
147. Though the appellate court found that Rodriguez had physically abused his
wife, it determined that, because of the standard of review, it could not reverse the
trial court. See id. at *8-9.
148. Id. at *6-7.
149. Id. at *8-9.
150. Id. at *12-13.
151. Id. at *12-13.
152. Id. at *13.
153. See id. at *12-13.

154. No. 03-97-00073-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5986 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 20,
1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
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torship when credible evidence of a "history or pattern" of abuse is
presented, by relying on the court's wide discretion to find it.155 The
mother was asking the court to hold that her testimony and that of a
friend should prove physical abuse as a matter of law. 156 The court of
appeals held that even if it accepted her testimony, it did not establish
the history or pattern of abuse required before the judge is prohibited
from appointing the parties as joint managing conservators.1 5 7 This
opinion showed a weakness in the law. The court stated, "The phrase
'history or pattern' is not defined in the Family Code, nor have we
found case law defining 'history or pattern' as it is used in the Code.
We therefore give the terms their ordinary meaning. "158 This case
demonstrated the problem with the presumption in TFC section
153.004-the court may avoid even reaching the presumption. Another decision presumably eliminated that problem.
In a published opinion, In re M.R., 5 9 the San Antonio Court of
Appeals attempted to deal with the exclusion of evidence crucial to a
TFC section 153.004 determination.1 60 The first issue was whether evidence of abuse by one parent against the other parent who was not a
spouse was admissible under TFC section 153.004.161 Although the
language of TFC section 153.004(a) stated only that evidence of violence by one "party against the party's spouse" was admissible,1 62 the
court extended the protection of TFC section 153.004 to unmarried
parents as well. 16 3 The Seventy-Sixth Legislature amended TFC section 153.004(a) to codify the holding of M.R.,1 64 therefore, further discussion of that issue is unnecessary.
The second issue involved the trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding a pending assault charge brought by the mother against the
father. 16 5 The mother's attempts to furnish evidence in the trial were
consistently thwarted by the judge, although the judge allowed the father plenty of opportunities to explore the mother's inappropriate behavior.166 "When [the mother]'s attorney first attempted to raise [an]
incident in which [the father] allegedly struck [the mother], [his] attorney objected. The basis of the objection was that a charge was cur155. See id. at *6.
156. Id. at *4.
157. Id. at *5.
158. Id. at *5-6.
159. 975 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
160. See id. at 53.
161. Id.
162. Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 147
(codified as amended at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(a) (Vernon 2002)).
163. M.R., 975 S.W.2d at 54.
164. Compare Act of May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 774, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3394, 3394 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(a)), with M.R.,
975 S.W.2d at 55.
165. See M.R., 975 S.W.2d at 52-53.
166. See id. at 55-56.
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rently pending on that incident, and because there was no final
conviction, the evidence was 'completely inadmissible."' 16 7 The judge
sustained the same objection eleven times. 168 The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case for new trial because the trial judge
"is mandated by the Family Code to take such evidence into account. 1 69 In conclusion, the court held, "in the best interest of the
child, a trial judge making a custody determination must provide all
parties to the suit a fair and impartial hearing and must consider credible evidence of violence committed by one parent against the
other. '" ° Taken together, these two statements imply that evidence
pertaining to a pending assault charge by one parent against the other
is credible evidence under TFC section 153.004.
Pena v. Pena,17 a 1998 Corpus Christi Court of Appeals case, once
again mangled the definition of "history or pattern of abuse." '72 The
mother was appealing the trial court's appointment of the father and
her as joint managing conservators despite the fact that she had introduced evidence of his abuse against her. 173 The court had to determine if a history or pattern of abuse was established, thereby
prohibiting the appointment of the parties as joint managing conservators. 174 The court held that a pattern is more than just multiple instances of violence.17 5 To define the phrase, the court looked to
statutes relating to other prohibited activity and determined that a
pattern "require[d] more than merely repeated instances of the prohibited conduct, but must include some relationship among the separate instances that tends to connect them and to show a threat of
continuing violations. '176 The mother presented uncontroverted testimony that the father had hit her on two occasions. 177 On one occasion, he caused a black eye and, on another occasion, he dragged her,
tearing her jeans in the process.1 78 The court of appeals held that, in
179
this case, the decision was within the court's discretion.

167. Id. at 55.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 57.
170. Id.
171. 986 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998), pet. denied, 8 S.W.3d 639
(Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
172. See Pena, 8 S.W.3d at 639.
173. Pena, 986 S.W.2d at 698.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 699.
176. Id. (citing H.J., Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238-39
(1989); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 217 (4th Cir. 1972)).
177. Id. at 698.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 699.
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The Texas Supreme Court subsequently denied the petition for review, allowing the lower court's holding to stand. 8 0 The court, however, issued a per curiam opinion disapproving of the following
language of the court below:
In the present case, the two hitting incidents left Diana with a
black eye each time. However, Diana's testimony only vaguely connects the two hitting incidents as both having been precipitated by
arguments over Omar's ex-wife and daughters. We do not know
who initiated the arguments, whether the hittings were provoked in
any manner, or what other factors may have contributed to either or
both incidents, or any other relevant details that may show a rela18 1
tionship, connection or predictable "pattern" of physical abuse.
The court provided a little guidance by holding that the above language was "not relevant to determining whether ... a history or pattern of domestic violence" or abuse exists under TFC section
153.004.182 Yet the court left many other questions unanswered, such
as what constitutes "credible evidence" or "a history or pattern" of
violence.
In Phillips v. Phillips,83 the First District Houston Court of Appeals discussed what evidence "rises to the level of domestic violence. ' 184 The father was appealing the trial court's designation of the
mother as the primary joint managing conservator of their two children. 185 The court held that nothing in the testimony against the
mother rose to the level of domestic violence. 186 The testimony included a description of an incident where the mother threw a doll at
her son and hit him on the head, which left a bump, and general testimony that their daughter had medical problems and that*the father
feared for her safety.1 87 On the other hand, several witnesses testified
188
that the father would thump their son, leaving ridges on his head.
The court said nothing about whether it thought the thumping rose to
the level of domestic violence, but it implied that the mother's conduct was less worrisome than the father's conduct. 18 9 The troubling
aspect of Phillips is not the result in that case, but the court's reiteration that trial courts have very broad discretion because the standard
180. Pena v. Pena, 8 S.W.3d 639, 639 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (disapproving of
lower court's language in determining "whether there was physical abuse or a history
or pattern of domestic violence under the statute").
181. Id. (quoting Pena, 986 S.W.2d at 699).
1"82. Id.
183. No. 01-97-01035-CV 1999, Tex. App. LEXIS 9369 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Dec. 16, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
184. See id. at *6-7.
185. Id. at *1.
186. See id. at *5-8.
187. Id. at *6-7.
188. Id. at *7.
189. See id. at *5, 8.
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of review is merely abuse of discretion.1 90 Such broad discretion
seems to ignore the spirit of TFC section 153.004, even before SB 140,
as the purpose of the statute is to limit the court's discretion in the
arena of family violence. 191
Clark v. Funk192 was another case in which the court appointed the

parents as joint managing conservators despite evidence of family vio-

lence.' 93 Clark testified at trial about three specific instances of physical violence by Funk against her and verbal abuse against Clark's
daughter.1 94 She argued that because she presented credible evidence

about Funk's violence, the court was not permitted to appoint them as
joint managing conservators. 195 "Credible evidence is more than
merely admissible evidence. It is evidence the trier of fact believes.
[W]hen a fact finder is presented with conflicting evidence, it may believe one witness and disbelieve others." 196 In essence, if the victim
can only present testimony-no hard evidence-regarding the violence, the trial court gets around the law by choosing to disregard any
testimony that it does not believe.' 9 7

Because there are no Texas Supreme Court decisions defining or
describing what constitutes a history or pattern of domestic violence

or what it considers to be credible evidence,' 98 this task is left to the
legislature. It was not, however, addressed with SB 140.
IV.

SENATE BILL

140

The Seventy-Seventh was not the first Texas Legislature that attempted to address the problems of TFC section 153.004;199 therefore,
the history of the bill is important in understanding any current shortcomings. SB 140 was sponsored by Senator Mike Moncrief and by
190. See id. at *3-4.
191. See, e.g., HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg.,
R.S. (2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
192. No. 08-97-00634-CV, 2000 WL 1203942 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 24, 2000, no
pet.) (not designated for publication).
193. See id. at *5-7.
194. Id. at *6.
195. Id. at *7.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Cf. Pena v. Pena, 8 S.W.3d 639, 639 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (disapproving of
the lower court's language in determining "whether there was physical abuse or a
history or pattern of domestic violence under the statute"), denying pet. to 986 S.W.2d
696 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998).
199. Since its enactment in 1995 by the Seventy-Fourth Legislature, Act of Apr. 6,
1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, TFC section 153.004 has
been amended at least once by every legislature except the Seventy-Fifth. See Act of
May 26, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 774, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3394; Act of May 17,
1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, § 3, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3411; Act of May 26, 1999,
76th Leg., R.S., ch. 774, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3394; Act of May 17, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 586, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1119.
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Representative Elliott Naishtat in the House of Representatives.2 00 A
similar bill, House Bill 1411,201 introduced by Naishtat in the SeventySixth Legislature, 20 2 was altered in the Senate Jurisprudence Committee after strong protest by many Texas judges. 20 3 House Bill 1411
"would have prohibited a court from appointing as sole managing
2 0°4
conservator a parent with a history of family violence or abuse.
The bill, as enacted, added subsection (d).2 0 5 "Some judges felt that
2 0°6
bill was too restrictive and would have taken away their discretion.
A.

The Text of Senate Bill 140

The introduced version of SB 140 contained language that changed
subsection (b) of section 153.004 by adding only the rebuttable presumption against an abuser being appointed sole managing
conservator:
(b) The court may not appoint joint managing conservators if
credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child. It is a
rebuttable presumption that the appointment of a parent as the sole
managing conservator of a child is not in the best interest of the
child if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past
or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by that parent
directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child.2 0 7
200. See HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S.
(2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
201. Tex. H.B. 1411, 76th Leg., R.S., 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3411.
202. H.J. OF TEX., 76th Leg., R.S. 350, 353 (1999), available at http://www.capitol.
state.tx.us/hjrnl/76r/html/home.htm.
203. See SENATE JURISPRUDENCE COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1411, 76th
Leg., R.S. (1999), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/SRC[BA.htm; H.J. OF
TEX., 76th Leg., R.S. 2438-39 (1999). Sen. Moncrief submitted a committee substitute
for the bill, stating that the removal of the "sole managing conservator" language was
in response to judges protesting a loss of judicial discretion in House Bill 208, Tex.
H.B. 208, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), which was left pending in committee. See Act of May
17, 1999: Hearings on Tex. H.B. 1411 Before the Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 76th
Leg., R.S. (May 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Mike Moncrief) (tape available from Senate Staff Services Office); Act of May 30, 1999: Hearings on Tex. H.B. 819 Before the
Senate Jurisprudence Comm., 76th Leg., R.S. (May 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Mike
Moncrief and testimony of David Shelton, President, Texas Father's Alliance) (tape
available from Senate Staff Services Office).
204. HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S.
(2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/hrofr/frame2.htm.
205. Act of May 17, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 787, § 3, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 3411,
3412 (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.004(d) (Vernon 2002)).
206. House RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S.
(2001).
207. Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (introduced version), http://www.capitol.
state.tx.us/tlo/77R/billtext/SB00140I.HTM.
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The bill was referred to the Jurisprudence Committee 20 8 and a public
hearing was held on January 29, 2001.209 No one testified against that
version of the bill, however. There was only Senator Wentworth's disbelief at the way courts were handling domestic violence cases.21 0 Six
out of nine Jurisprudence Committee Members approved that version;
2 11 It
the remaining three members were absent and did not vote.
2 12
vote.
viva-voce
by
2001,
15,
February
on
Senate
the
passed in
The companion House Bill 960, with exactly the same language as
the introduced version of SB 140,213 was referred to the House Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues on February 6, 2001.214
The House Committee considered the companion bill in a public hearing on February 20, 2001.215 In that hearing, the bill met some opposition. A representative from Texas Father's Alliance felt that the
rebuttable presumption would create more unfair trial tactics in a custody battle.2 16 Representative Dale Tillery had a problem with subsection (b) being too broad.2 17 He was disturbed that the bill did not
include a time limit, like the two-year time limit in subsections (a) and
(d).2 18 He was also concerned about what the definition of credible
evidence would be, and what evidence would be sufficient to trigger
the presumption. 21 9 Representative Naishtat and Bree Buchanan
from the Texas Council on Family Violence responded, basically, that
the judge has broad discretion.2 20 If any evidence was too attenuated
in issue or in time, then it would rebut the presumption.22 1 The House
Bill was left pending on that day so that SB 140 could be considered in
lieu of the companion bill.2 22 SB 140 was reported favorably from the
208. S.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 38 (2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.
us/sjrnl/77r/html/home.htm.
209. See Senate Hearings,supra note 15.
210. Id. at Tape 2, Side A (statement of Sen. Jeff Wentworth, Member, Senate Jurisprudence Comm.).
211. Id.
212. S.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 346 (2001).
213. Compare Tex. H.B. 960, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (introduced version), http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/77R/billtext/HB00960I.HTM, with Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg.,
R.S. (2001) (introduced version), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/77R/billtext/SB00
1401.HTM.
214. H.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 286, 288 (2001), available at http://www.capitol.
state.tx.us/hjrnl/77r/html/home.htm.
215. See House Hearings,supra note 42.
216. See id. at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of David Shelton, President, Texas Father's Alliance).
217. See id. (statement of Rep. Dale Tillery, Member, House Comm. on Juvenile
Justice & Family Issues).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. (testimony of Bree Buchanan, Public Policy Director, Texas Council on
Family Violence, and statement of Rep. Elliott Naishtat, Member, House Comm. on
Juvenile Justice & Family Issues).
221. See id.
222. See id. (action of Rep. Toby Goodman, Chair, House Comm. on Juvenile Justice & Family Issues).
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House Committee on February 27, 2001.223 In the House Committee,
Representative Toby Goodman added the following language to subsection (b): "or as a conservator
who has the right to determine the
224
primary residence of a child.
The bill was not read for the second time in the House until May 9,
2001, when Representative Richard Raymond offered the following
amendment: "including a sexual assault in violation of Section 22.011
or 22.021 of the Penal Code that results in the other parent becoming
pregnant with the child. '2 25 The amendment was adopted without objection. 226 Then Representative Goodman offered a second amendment, which is now the language of subsection (e). 22 7 That
amendment was also adopted without objection, and the bill was
passed as amended to the third and final reading.22 8
The bill was read for the third time on May 10, 2001.229 Representative Raymond offered his second amendment that defined the sexual abuse addressed in his previous amendment. 230 He offered, and
the House adopted without objection, the following amendment: "A
history of sexual abuse includes a sexual assault that results in the
other parent becoming pregnant
with the child, regardless of the prior
23 1
relationship of the parents."
The bill was then passed back to the Senate, where the Senate concurred in the House amendments on May 17, 2001, by a viva-voce
vote.23 2 The bill was signed by the governor on June 11, 2001 and
became effective on September 1, 2001.233 As enacted, SB 140
amended subsection (b) and added subsection (e) to TFC section
153.004:
223. See Hearings on Tex. H.B. 960 Before the House Comm. on Juvenile Justice &
Family Issues, 77th Leg., R.S. Tape 1, Side A (Feb. 27, 2001) (tapes on file with the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review).
224. See S.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 2241-42 (2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/srnlI/77r/htmIhome.htm; see also HOUSE COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
& FAMILY ISSUES, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. S.B. 140, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001), http://www.
capitol.state.tx.us.
225. H.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 2844 (2001), available at http://www.capitol.state.
tx.us/hjrnl/77r/html/home.htm.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2844-45. Subsection (e) reads:
It is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of a child for a
parent to have unsupervised visitation with the child if credible evidence is
presented of a history or pattern of past or present child neglect or physical
or sexual abuse by that parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or
a child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(e) (Vernon 2002).
228. H.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 2845 (2001).
229. Id. at 2902.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. S.J. OF TEX., 77th Leg., R.S. 2242, 2244 (2001), available at http://www.capitol.
state.tx.us/sjrnl/77r/html/home.htm.
233. Id. at 2243.
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(b) The court may not appoint joint managing conservators if
credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child, including sexual
assault in violation of Section 22.011 or 22.021, Penal Code, that
results in the other parent becoming pregnant with the child. A history of sexual abuse includes a sexual assault that results in the
other parent becoming pregnant with the child, regardless of the
prior relationship of the parents. It is a rebuttable presumption that
the appointment of a parent as the sole managing conservator of a
child or as the conservator who has the exclusive right to determine
the primary residence of a child is not in the best interest of the
child if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past
or present child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by that parent
directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child.
(e) It is a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest
of a child for a parent to have unsupervised visitation with the child
if credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or
present child neglect or physical or sexual abuse by that parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child.234
B.

The Problems Addressed by Senate Bill 140

Although SB 140 did not fully address the shortcomings of TFC
section 153.004, it took the legislature and the courts one step in the
right direction. The amendment to subsection (b) added a rebuttable
presumption against a parent who is violent, which would theoretically solve the problem in A.L.R.2 35 and M.R. 2 36-where the trial
court simply chose to ignore credible evidence (a father's admission
and a pending assault charge) of family violence.23 7 If such evidence
is admitted, and M.R. said it should not be kept out,238 then the presumption is triggered and the court must address it, leaving the party
against whom the presumption operates to rebut it.239 The rebuttable
presumption addition to subsection (b) is the medium between the
earlier proposed strict prohibition against appointing a violent parent
as sole managing conservator (if credible evidence is presented) and
the language of subsection (a) that only requires evidence within the
last two years be considered without telling the court what to do with
234. Act of May 17, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 586, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1119,
1119 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b), (e) (Vernon 2002)).

235. No. 04-96-00455-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 3427 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
July 2,
236.
237.
238.
239.

1997, no writ) (not designated for publication).
975 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
See A.L.R., 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 3427 at *6-9; M.R., 975 S.W.2d at 53.
M.R., 975 S.W.2d at 57; see supra text accompanying notes 165-70.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b) (Vernon 2002).
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the evidence. 240 However, Long,24 1 Pena,2 42 and Phillips2 43 demon-

strate that the problem does not lie with the direction the legislature
gives the trial court; rather it lies with what evidence the trial court
allows and how the evidence is classified.

Professor Paulsen noted in his 1999 survey that the difficulty comes
with getting the court to classify evidence as credible.244 If the court
does not consider the evidence to be credible, the prohibition in the
case of appointing joint managing conservators or the rebuttable presumption does not come into effect. 245 And since the passage of SB
140, the standard the trial
courts use to define credible evidence has
2 46
become more stringent

Some judges are upset with the passage of SB 140, specifically sub-

section (e) relating to supervised visitation.2 47 Because that provision
was added to the bill in the second reading before passing the House,
there was no time to have a public hearing on it, and thus any opposi-

tion to subsection (e) went unheard.248 For example, in the past, Dal-

las County judges considered a protective order to be credible
evidence of family violence. 249 TFC section 81.001 states: "A court
shall render a protective order as provided by Section 85.001(b) if the
court finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in
the future.' '25° A local practitioner was recently surprised when a
judge held that he no longer considered protective orders "credible
evidence. 2 51 According to that judge, the finding of family violence
normally required in protective orders does not occur in family court;
therefore, such a finding would no longer be considered credible evidence of violence, even though another court has deemed it credible
240. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b), with Tex. H.B. 1411, 76th Leg.,
R.S. (1999) (introduced version), http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/76R/bilItext/HB01
4111.HTM), and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(a).
241. No. 03-97-00073-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5986 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 20,
1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
242. 986 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998), pet. denied, 8 S.W.3d 639
(Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
243. No. 01-97-01035-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 9369 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Dec. 16, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication).
244. See Paulsen, supra note 16, at 1209.
245. See id.
246. Interview with Celestina Contreras, Director, Domestic Violence Legal Clinic,
SMU School of Law, in Dallas, Tex. (Sept. 4, 2001) (transcript on file with the Texas
Wesleyan Law Review).
247. Id.
248. Telephone Interview with Chris Young, supra note 12. According to Mr.
Young, the only way that the text regarding the supervised visitation would have had
time to be considered and passed, was if it were added as an amendment to legislation
already pending. Id.
249. Interview with Celestina Contreras, supra note 246.
250. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 81.001 (Vernon 2002) (emphasis added).
251. Interview with Celestina Contreras, supra note 246.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

25

TEXAS
WESLEYAN
LAW
REVIEW
Texas
Wesleyan
Law Review, Vol.
9 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 6

[Vol. 9

and issued an order based upon the finding of family violence.2 52 Section 85.001 of the Family Code reads:
(a) At the close of a hearing on an application for a protective
order, the court shall find whether:
(1) family violence has occurred; and
(2) family violence is likely to occur in the future.
(b) If the court finds that family violence has occurred and that
family violence is likely to occur in the future, the court:
(1) shall render a protective order as provided by Section
85.022 applying only to a person found to have committed family violence ....
The court did not accept a protective order as credible evidence despite the fact that the issuing court is required to adjudicate the question of violence.2 54
It is unknown why judges would be resistant to the amendment simply because they did not get the opportunity to express any opposition
to it before it was passed. One possible reason is that supervised visitation is a costly enterprise that requires continuing court supervision. 5 Or Texas may be seeing a reflection of gender bias in the
courtroom.2 5 6 Regardless of the reason, a court's reluctance, or outright failure, to find credible evidence or a history or pattern of abuse
violates the spirit of TFC section 153.002. With the lax "abuse of discretion" standard of review, the exception may very well be the rule
because the trial court's ruling will seldom be overturned. 7
V.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT

What is the purpose of TFC section 153.004? The answer to that
question reveals the shortcoming of the section as amended. The legislative goal was to protect the victims of family violence, whether the
victim was the parent or the child.2 58 Prior amendments show the legislature's attempt to guide the court in this direction, although the guidance has been gradual. With key terms remaining undefined and an
"abuse of discretion" standard of review intact,25 9 the legislature has
left the trial court too much leeway to ensure that those victims of
domestic violence are being protected.
The Louisiana legislature had already taken the "logical next step"
addressed by the sole managing conservator amendment to TFC sec252. Id.

253.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 85.001.

254. Interview with Celestina Contreras, supra note 246.
255. Id. The issues of how supervised visitation is conducted and the costs associated with it are outside the scope of this Note.
256. Because victims of domestic violence are typically women, a bias against them
can be viewed as gender bias. See sources cited supra note 36.
257. See Paulsen, supra note 16, at 1206-10.
258. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., supra notes 129-97 and accompanying text.
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tion 153.004.260 A comparable Louisiana statute was enacted in 1992
and amended in 1995.261 With ten years of experience
behind it, the
262
Louisiana statute is a model for Texas to follow.

The Louisiana statute states:
A. There is created a presumption that no parent who has a history of perpetrating family violence shall be awarded sole or joint
custody of children. The court may find a history of perpetrating
family violence if the court finds that one incident of family violence
has resulted in serious bodily injury or the court finds more than one
incident of family violence. The presumption shall be overcome

only by a preponderance of the evidence that the perpetrating parent has successfully completed a treatment program as defined in
R.S. 9:362, is not abusing alcohol and the illegal use of drugs scheduled in R.S. 40:964, and that the best interest of the child or children
requires that parent's participation as a custodial parent because of
the other parent's absence, mental illness, or substance abuse, or
such other circumstances which affect the best interest of the child
or children. The fact that the abused parent suffers from the effects
of the abuse shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.
B. If the court finds that both parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, custody shall be awarded solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate family violence. In
such a case, the court shall mandate completion of a treatment program by the custodial parent. If necessary to protect the welfare of
the child, custody may be awarded to a suitable third person, provided that the person would not allow access to a violent parent
except as ordered by the court.
C. If the court finds that a parent has a history of perpetrating
family violence, the court shall allow only supervised child visitation
with that parent, conditioned upon that parent's participation in and
completion of a treatment program. Unsupervised visitation shall
be allowed only if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that the violent parent has completed a treatment program, is not
abusing alcohol and psychoactive drugs, and poses no danger263to the

child, and that such visitation is in the child's best interest.

The Texas Legislature defined "family violence ' 2' and "sexual
abuse ' 265 for the courts, but neither the legislature nor the Texas Supreme Court has defined either "credible evidence" or "history or
pattern" as it applies to TFC section 153.004.266 Because the trial
courts are too hesitant to find a history or pattern without legislative
260. See House Hearings, supra note 42, at Tape 1, Side B (testimony of Gina

Lungwitz, Co-Director, University of Texas School of Law Domestic Violence Clinic).
261. See Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364
(West 2002).
262. See id.
263. Id. § 9:364(A)-(C) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
264. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN.

§ 71.004 (Vernon 2002).

265. Id. § 153.004(b).
266. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 154-98.
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

27

TEXAS
WESLEYAN
LAW
REVIEW
Texas
Wesleyan
Law Review, Vol.
9 [2022],
Iss. 1, Art. 6

[Vol. 9

directive, the Texas Legislature should start by using Louisiana's statutory definitions.
"Credible evidence" cannot be defined precisely. However, the legislature could give examples of what would satisfy the criteria; for example, a family violence conviction, a protective order regardless of
the court it was issued in, or a doctor's or social worker's report.
"History or pattern" should be defined in Texas, as Louisiana defines it, by allowing a finding if there is "more than one incident of
family violence," or if "one incident of family violence ... result[s] in
serious bodily injury."2'6 7 Using Battaglia's case as an example, his
conviction for assaulting his first wife would have activated the rebuttable presumption against him being appointed as sole managing conservator, and against his ability to receive unsupervised visitation with
his daughters upon divorce from his second marriage. 2 68 He would
have had to convince the judge-present evidence to rebut the presumption-that it was in his children's best interest to appoint him as
sole managing conservator or even to allow him to have unsupervised
visitation.2 69
In addition, defining the terms makes it more difficult for the
mother to be intimidated into an agreement. If credible or multiple
evidence of family violence exists, presumably a mother could not
agree to the father being appointed as sole managing conservator, or
to the father having unsupervised visitations without the court holding
a hearing to rebut the presumption.2 7 ° Presumably a batterer's attempt to influence a judge is less effective than it is against his former
or current victim.
What evidence would he need to rebut the presumptions? Not
every case will be like Battaglia's. Texas legislation provides no guidance to the trial court, but Louisiana legislation does.2 71 Although
the Texas Legislature may not want to require the specific acts that
Louisiana requires, it should still provide some guidance, such as requiring completion of a treatment program.
Furthermore, the court should abandon the "all-forgiving" abuse of
discretion standard. That standard ensures that the trial court's decision will rarely, if ever, be overturned. The standard of review should
be de novo because of the importance of child welfare. If judges knew
that they would be reviewed de novo, their decisions might be more
thoughtful at the trial level. It would also assure the victim a second
chance for a fair decision.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
STAT.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A).

See id.; McGonigle, Link to Battaglia, supra note 60; McKee, supra note 62.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A).
See id.
Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (Vernon 2002), with LA. REV.
ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2002).
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SENATE
VI.

CONCLUSION

Enacting SB 140 was a progressive step for Texas family violence
law. SB 140 provided guidance to courts in choosing the sole managing conservator and providing for visitation.2 72 However, the statute
still raises more questions than it answers. Accordingly, the legislature should clarify ambiguous terms, give more guidance to the courts
regarding how the presumptions laid out in the statute should be rebutted, and provide for a more strict standard of review.
The above recommendations are not too strict for the following reasons: (1) Any custody or visitation order is not final and is always
subject to modification; (2) If the plaintiff must present evidence to
reach such a presumption, it is not "unfair" to require the respondent
to present evidence to rebut it; and (3) The welfare of our children is a
compelling enough reason to require some time and preciseness on
the part of the courts and the legislature.
Shelly Holcomb
272. See discussion supra Part IV.
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